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ABSTRACT
Legally binding custom is conventionally analyzed in terms of two
independent elements: regularities of behavior (usus) and convictions
of actors engaging in the behavior that it is legally required (opinio
juris). This additive conception of custom is deeply flawed. This
Essay argues that we must abandon the additive conception and
replace it with an account of custom that understands legally relevant
customs as norms that arise from discursive normative practices
embedded in rich contexts of social interaction characterized by
intermeshing anticipations and interconnected conduct. The hallmark
of legally binding customs, it is argued, is not the addition of belief or
conviction to behavior, but rather the integration of meaningful
conduct into a web of legally recognized reasons and arguments.
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INTRODUCTION

Customs, social rules, and conventions are pervasive in our lives.
They guide our actions as we navigate complex interactions of social
life; they give social significance to the material things that often
mediate those relations; and, even more, they define horizons within
which actions we conceive and deliberatively entertain actions we
undertake. Moreover, for millennia custom has been regarded as an
important kind, or source, or ground of law. Although its importance
has seemed to decline in modern legal systems, it is often not far
below the surface in important parts of municipal law, and it is still
thought to play an indispensable role in international law.
An analysis that breaks custom into an external element—
regularities of behavior (usus)—and an internal element—convictions
of custom followers that behavior conforming to the regularities is
legally required (opinio juris)—has been nearly irresistible to
theorists of law and of custom generally. What is more natural than to
think that custom is a matter of consistent patterns of behavior
observable from the outside plus some interior state like belief,
attitude, or conviction, which turns patterns of behavior into norms
for behavior? Yet, this additive conception of custom, despite its
dominance, is deeply flawed, if not incoherent. Many of its problems
are frequently rehearsed and recognized, and then almost
immediately ignored. The jurisprudence of custom has long been in
the grip of a kind of additive addiction, fed by the irresistible
naturalness of its approach and the absence of any plausible
alternative.
The project of this Essay is to sketch such an alternative, an
integrated account that proposes to understand legally relevant
customs as embedded in and arising from discursive normative
practices. Inspiring this alternative approach is a brief sketch of
custom by an ancient sophist turned stoic, which provides a useful foil
for a terse characterization of the additive conception. (It also
provides evidence that the additive conception is not completely
irresistible.) I then seek to break the addiction to this conception in
three steps. First, I briefly show how the “outside” versus “inside”
trope that dominates thinking about custom beguiles theorists into an
uncritical adoption of the additive conception. Second, I argue that
this conception is bedeviled by problems deeper than the paradoxes
and uncertainties widely, if uncomfortably, acknowledged in the
jurisprudence of custom. Finally, I articulate and defend an
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alternative conception, the normative practice account. For this
purpose, I focus on three core concepts and the interrelationships
between them: normative practice, reciprocally oriented conduct, and
discursive interaction. The proposal is that legally significant customs
take shape in discursive normative practices in rich contexts of social
interaction characterized by intermeshing anticipations and
interconnected conduct. I conclude with a brief discussion of the
appropriateness of this conception of custom for law, especially
international law. First, I argue that international relations are
characterized by the kind of social interaction that provides a natural
habitat for the essentially discursive practice of international law. But,
second, I concede that the additive conception may still play a role in
some legal systems, not as a basis for understanding the nature of
custom or its normative force, but rather as framing evidentiary
standards adopted by those systems for proof of the legal standing or
validity of a given custom in them.
I. THE ADDITIVE CONCEPTION OF CUSTOM
1

In his discourse on custom, Dio Chrysostom wrote,
Custom is a judgement common to those who use it, an unwritten
law of tribe or city, a voluntary principle of justice, acceptable to all
alike with reference to the same matters, an invention made, not by
any human being, but rather by life and time. Therefore, while of
the laws in general each obtains its power through having been
approved once and for all, custom is constantly being subjected to
scrutiny. Moreover, while no law will readily be chosen by
everybody—for it is by the opinions of the majority that it is
ratified—yet a custom could not come into being if not accepted by
all. Again, while law by threats and violence maintains its mastery, it
is only when we are persuaded by our customs that we deem them
2
excellent and advantageous.

1. Dio Cocceianus Chrysostomus was a first-century Greek orator and historian. Born in
Bythinia around 40 CE, he began his career as a sophist but later embraced stoicism. Nearly
eighty of his discourses or orations on a wide variety of topics survive, among them one on law
(number 75) and one on custom (number 76).
2. DIO CHRYSOSTOM, The Seventy-Sixth Discourse: On Custom, in 5 DISCOURSES 253,
253 (T.E. Page, E. Capps, W.H.D. Rouse, L.A. Post & E.H. Warmington eds., H. Lamar Crosby
trans., 1951) (n.d.).
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3

Custom, Julian instructs us, is “law established by usage” —
4
customary law arises from the acts and deeds of ordinary practice.
We can use Dio’s discussion in the above passage to clarify this point:
custom is a matter of judgment—that is, a matter of usage or practice
involving and engaging judgment—and this custom-shaping judgment
is common among participants in the practice. Although unwritten,
custom has the nature and force of law. Its existence, like that of all
law, is a contingent matter, being a product of invention; however,
custom is made not by individual human hands and wills, but by life
and time. As such it is flexible, open to reformulation and reformation,
and inviting rather than silencing scrutiny. Dio highlights its voluntary
character: it is approved by those it governs, approval not extracted
by force or duress like enacted law, but based on persuasion and
critical scrutiny. A little later he adds, with rhetorical flourish, that
enacted laws “create a polity of slaves,” whereas “customs, on the
5
contrary, create a polity of free men.” His point is that customs arise
from the common life of the people, from their judgment-engaged
practice, unlike enacted law, which is typically imposed. Their
consensus is not a matter of individual agreement with the rules, but
common or collective agreement in them, and therein, according to
Dio, lies their claim to legitimacy.
This profile of law-determining custom stands in sharp contrast
with the conception of custom dominant in modern jurisprudence. On
this account, custom determines law just when added to certain
regularities of behavior (usus) are facts about the attitudes, beliefs,
6
intentions, or wills (opinio juris) of those who exhibit that behavior.
The former is said to be the quantitative, objective, or material
element of custom; the latter is said to be the qualitative, subjective,
or psychological element. The International Court of Justice, writing
in 1985, embraced this additive view of the juridical nature of
international custom. It is “axiomatic” in international jurisprudence,

3. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 44–45 (1985) (quoting DIG. 1.3.32.1 (Julian,
Digest 84)).
4. See id. (“[F]or Julian it appears to be that the custom is law because the people accept
it as law.”).
5. CHRYSOSTOM, supra note 2, at 255.
6. See, e.g., Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 89, 91 (2011) (identifying two views of custom: “[o]n the one hand, it is a ‘general
practice accepted as law,’ that is to say according to the most classic analysis, a material element
and a psychological element, opinio juris sive necessitatis, and on the other hand, it is a norm”
(footnote omitted)).
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the court in that case maintained, that customary law is to be found
7
“primarily in the practice and opinio juris of States.” This analysis
has not been limited to the jurisprudence of international law, but has
been used to explain customary law of all kinds. At least since the
nineteenth century, this pattern of analysis has been dominant. By
mid-twentieth century, it had become a commonplace as an accepted,
indispensable, albeit admittedly puzzling, starting point. Professor
Hans Kelsen, for example, writes,
Custom is a usual or habitual course of action, a long-established
practice . . . . But the frequency of conduct, the fact that certain
actions or abstentions have repeatedly been performed during a
certain period of time, is only one element of the law-creating fact
called custom. The second element is the fact that the individuals
whose conduct constitutes the custom must be convinced that they
fulfill, by their actions or abstentions, a duty, or that they exercise a
right. They must believe that they apply a norm, but they need not
8
believe that it is a legal norm which they apply.

In one of the most recent book-length studies of legal custom,
Professor David Bederman writes,
the best algorithm for the creation of customary norms is the
traditional notion that there must be both proof of an objective
practice within a relevant community and a subjective determination
of the value of the norm, whether expressed as a sense of legal
9
obligation or the reasonableness of the rule.

This formulation is notable for the almost studied ambiguity of the
term “subjective,” which could be taken to mean either evaluative or
a matter of belief or attitude.
Professor John Tasioulas disambiguates this thesis in one way. A
custom has legally binding status, in his view, when
[t]he creation of an international legal rule according to which the
specified pattern of behavior would be lawful is ethically justified,
and such a legal rule should be created by means of a process that

7. Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 27 (June 3).
8. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (1952).
9. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW, at xi, 171–72 (2010).
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involves general state practice consistent with it and an ethical
10
endorsement by states of its establishment.

For Professor Tasioulas the ethical justification of the rule is the
11
pivot; state practice is not even necessary. Professor Brian Lepard
chooses the other solution to the ambiguity. Taking “opinio” literally
to mean “opinion,” he understands the subjective dimension in terms
of parties’ belief in the moral desirability of a rule of a certain sort’s
being recognized as law. He states his central thesis clearly at the
opening of his study:
A customary international norm arises when states generally believe
that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative
legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain
conduct. This belief constitutes opinio juris, and it is sufficient to
create a customary law norm. It is not necessary in every case to
satisfy a separate “consistent state practice” requirement. Rather,
state practice can serve as one source of evidence that states believe
that a particular authoritative legal principle or rule is desirable now
12
or in the near future.

What is remarkable, although not unique, in both of these
accounts is that they embrace the additive conception, accepting its
dualist analytical distinction, but assign to the so-called material
dimension a marginal status. That is, they rely on the dualist
conceptual framework and its sharp distinction between internal, or
subjective, and external, or objective, elements, but then suppress the
second term of the dualism. In Professor Lepard’s account, for
example, state practice is regarded as only providing some evidence
13
of the requisite state opinio juris. Thus these recent proposals do not
reject the additive conception, but rather embrace one-sided versions
of it.
10. John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global Justice, in THE
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307,
323 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007).
11. Id. at 310.
12. BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 8 (2010).
13. Id. at 122–39. Ironically, in Professor Lepard’s account it turns out that the subjective
side is entirely fictional. Whereas his theory takes opinio juris as the only determinant of the
content and legal status of international customary norms, his practical proposal pays attention
only to deeds and words. He claims that the deeds and words of states’ officials must be taken as
evidence of the required attitudes, but he offers no account of the evidential relationship
between official deeds or words and the beliefs of states. Opinio juris, in fact, functions as a legal
fiction.
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Professor Maurice Mendelson, however, suggests a very different
analysis, which resists the additive conception. “A rule of customary
international law,” he writes, “is one which emerges from, and is
sustained by, the constant and uniform practice of States and other
subjects of international law, in their international relations, in
circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar
14
conduct in the future.” A similar analysis can be found in the
Uniform Commercial Code (in a section authored by Professor Karl
Llewellyn). It defines a legally binding “usage of trade” as “any
practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in
a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
15
observed with respect to the transaction in question.” On this view,
rather than isolating and combining two distinct components—usus
and opinio juris—the practice of participants in the custom is set in a
context of interaction from which legitimate expectations arise.
Mendelson, Llewellyn, and Dio Chrysostom are rare among
analysts of legal custom. Most legal theorists, beguiled by the
outside/inside trope, have found the additive conception nearly
irresistible. This trope leads those who observe the outside of
customary conduct to search for something on the inside to explain its
legal status, and the only eligible sense of “inside” seemed to be
“internal,” or “mental.” Often background theoretical commitments
reinforce this natural move. In international-law theory, for example,
when the doctrine of state sovereignty was dominant, it was thought
that respect for the sovereign equality of states entailed that states
could be bound only by consent. Consent was thought to be explicit in
treaty regimes and implicit in customary law, although no less
important because implicit. Consent was a matter of some internal
16
attitude of the officials of states.
Theorists have also been beguiled by this trope when they
thought of custom as a source of law. On a dominant view, sources of
law are thought of in terms of origins in a canonical kind of event,
17
namely, behavior manifesting an exercise of will. To think of custom
14. Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL
155, 188 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
15. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2012).
16. Raphael M. Walden, former Director of the Treaty Division in the Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, offers a thorough discussion of this trend in Raphael M. Walden, The Subjective
Element in the Formation of Customary International Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 344 (1977).
17. This view has its roots in classical positivist legal theory. See generally, e.g., JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). For a general discussion of
DES COURS
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as a source of law, on this view, is just to think of it as a mode of
lawmaking on the model of explicit legislation involving an exercise
of will. Francisco Suárez’s thoughts about custom in law illustrate this
18
beguiled line of thought. Initially, he distinguished two dimensions
19
of custom: its factual dimension and its juridical dimension. But
when he turned to an analysis of the juridical dimension, his general
theory of law dictated his analysis of custom. Custom, he argued, is
20
made by the people. But, because all law, on Suárez’s view, is the
product of will and intention, he inferred that custom has juridical
status only if it proceeds from the will and intention of the people, the
relevant intention being an intention to establish the rule as legally
21
binding. This conclusion suggests the additive conception of custom,
to which Suárez was led by his general jurisprudential commitments.
We must follow the lead of Dio Chrysostom and Professor
Mendelson and resist these beguilements, because the additive
analysis of custom to which they lead is untenable.
II. AGAINST ADDITION
The additive conception regards legally binding customary
practice as the combination of two discrete sets of empirical facts:
facts about behavior and facts about attitudes (beliefs, feelings,
desires, approvings, intendings, and the like). Regularities of
behavior, thought to be observable and recognizable apart from
considering the attitudes (that is, viewed from the outside), are said to
be transformed when those who engage in those regularities have the
right kind of attitude or mental state, namely, regarding themselves as

this trend in legal theory, see Gerald J. Postema, Legal Positivism—Early Foundations, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 31 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012), and
references therein.
18. Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), philosopher, theologian, and legal theorist, was a leading
figure in the Second Scholastic School of Salamanca. He wrote extensively on topics in
metaphysics and general philosophy, but his work, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver
(1612), is a major contribution to legal philosophy and is among the two or three most
important early theories of international law.
19. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in 2 SELECTIONS
FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J. 440, 447–48 (James Brown Scott ed.,
Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, John Waldron & Henry Davis trans., 1944) (1612).
20. Id. at 553.
21. Id. at 565. I mistakenly overlooked this part of Suárez’s account of custom in Gerald J.
Postema, Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account, in THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 10, at 279–80, 287.
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bound by the rule constituted by that behavioral regularity, or
approving of that rule, or some other similar attitude.
Consider, first, the behavioral dimension. It is true that a custom
does not exist unless it is instantiated in the behavior of people
allegedly governed by it. But, strictly speaking, there is no such thing
as the custom’s rule—the regularity of behavior—viewed on its own.
It is a commonplace view of contemporary philosophy that the
problem is not that no rule or pattern can be constructed from a
collection of bits of behavior, but rather that an indefinite number of
such patterns are logically projectable from the same collection. But if
there is an indefinite number of such projectable patterns, then there
is no rule. For a rule is a discrete pattern with some claim to
normative status for those engaged in the practice that distinguishes
behavior in accord with it from other modes of behaving, treating
them as wrong, or mistaken, or violations. No pattern that exists
simply as one among an indefinite number can make that claim.
Projectable patterns are not (yet) rules. Of course, not all possible
projectable patterns are salient to us; indeed, only a few will be. And
it may be that what is salient to one of us is salient to many of us; we
might as a matter of fact see the same pattern. But there is no reason
to be confident that this convergence identifies the custom-relevant
pattern in the bits of behavior that are available to observers. The
custom-relevant pattern is the pattern made meaningful by the
practice, not some other pattern that many inside or outside the
practice can identify. Indeed, the pattern is likely to be salient
because it is meaningful within the practice, rather than meaningful
because it is salient.
Thus, instances of behavior exhibit a custom-relevant regularity
only when viewed as deeds—that is, as socially meaningful. And we
can uncover this meaning only from within the practice. Should we
say, then, that we can uncover this meaning only, as Professor H.L.A.
22
Hart put it, “from the internal point of view”? There is something
right about this suggestion, but it is misleading if we adopt a reading
of “internal point of view” that many have found tempting. That is, it
is tempting to regard the internal point of view that Professor Hart
talks about as the domain of the attitudes of participants in the
practice. And that way of understanding the internal point of view
seems to return us to the additive conception. On this reading, we
might say that the relevant convergence of behavior just is the
22. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88–91, 102–03 (2d ed. 1994).
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regularity that is isolated in the content of the convergent attitudes of
these participants—in other words, the behavior is convergent only
when participants have the same rule in mind and take the same
relevant attitudes toward it. This proposal, however, also fails to
understand the nature of normative practices.
One reason for its failure lies in the fact that customs are social
rules, not mere personal resolutions. Thus, the relevant convergence
of attitudes must not be accidental. The mere fact that a number of
people regard a certain kind of behavior as required of them and that
they happen to have the same kind of behavior in mind does not
guarantee that they are practicing or following a common rule. What,
then, must we add to this convergence to make sure that we have a
common rule in view? Professor Hart suggested two different
conditions. One qualified the content of the rule on which there was
convergence: each must view the regularity as a common, public
standard, as opposed to seeing it as just a rule for me, a rule that I act
23
on “for [my] part only.” The other condition qualified the agents’
reason for complying: each must follow the rule in part for the reason
24
that it is widely followed by others.
Professor Hart’s suggestions have provoked much thinking about
custom and social rules in recent years, but neither of them
guarantees that a convergence of behavior or attitude explained in
these ways, should it occur, is not merely accidental. The latter
suggestion puts convergence of the behavior among the conditions of
complying with the rule, but it does not guarantee nonaccidental
convergence of the content of attitudes regarding the rule. The
former suggestion brings into view a more fundamental problem
facing this way of fixing the rule of the practice. Talk of convergence
of the content of internal attitudes presupposes that it is possible to
determine that participants have the same rule in mind without
appeal to regularities of behavior viewed from the outside.
This determination cannot be done, however. The content of the
rule that any one agent seeks to follow gets determinate content only
insofar as it fits into two other aspects of the practice to which the
agent’s conduct contributes: the network of reasons and the network
of accountability given shape by the practice. First, the rule gets
determinate content in part from the context of practical deliberation,
the network of reason seeking, reason giving, and reason using, in
23. Id. at 116.
24. Id. at 255–56.
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which the rule is seen as a reason for action and conduct is seen as
reasonable or justified (or inadequate, or failing) in its terms. In this
way, the rule fits into the network of reasons engaged by the practice.
Second, the content of the rule is also determined in part by the deeds
already engaged in in its name (that is, within the scope of its reason
giving), as judged by others who can appreciate the rule and the
reason for action it offers. In this way, the rule fits into the practice’s
network of accountability. Without accountability to others for
adhering to one’s commitment, it will not be possible for an agent
(from the inside, as it were) to distinguish between complying with
one’s rule and seeming, to one, to do so. It will not be possible to
distinguish between failing to follow the rule and following a different
rule. And if that distinction is not available, then it would not be
possible for an agent actually to fail to follow the rule, and a rule that
one cannot in principle fail to follow is not a normative rule. So, there
is no way to determine the content of a rule without reference to both
the deeds and the deliberative reasoning characteristic of the practice.
The content of the attitudes of actors is the content determined by
their participation in a deliberative normative practice.
The inseparability of concrete deeds and deliberation is evident
if we attend to the natural habitat of custom. Customary rules are
rules of a particular community that govern, but also emerge from,
25
the interactions of its members. In this context, members of the
community not only act in the presence of other members, but their
conduct and deliberations are necessarily oriented toward the actions
and deliberations of others. As Professor Lon Fuller pointed out,
customs are not matters of simple imitation, like hikers following the
26
path blazed by the lone pathfinder. Professor Fuller seems to have in
mind the idea that customs emerge in contexts of social interaction in
which the practical significance and force of a pattern is a function of
its ability to focus the deliberation and choice of people who are
oriented to each other because they are dependent on each other. For
this purpose, the pattern in action must be public, “the same message
27
in the common situation,” as Professor Thomas Schelling put it. The
message is in the deed. Any one person’s grasp is adequate to its
25. For a classic discussion of this notion, see Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the
Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1969). For a discussion of Professor Fuller’s account of customary rules
and their importance for understanding law, see Gerald J. Postema, Implicit Law, 13 LAW &
PHIL. 361 (1994).
26. Fuller, supra note 25, at 4.
27. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54 (1960).
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purpose—it names the deed and brings its hoped-for results—only to
the extent that it meshes successfully with the grasp of others in the
community with whom the agent interacts. Deed and message,
behavior and practical uptake are inextricable.
There is one further problem with the proposal to fix the rule of
a custom by looking to convergence of the contents of participants’
attitudes. It is not uncommon that there is not anything like the same
rule that every participant, or even a goodly number of participants,
have in mind. As Professor Ronald Dworkin observed long ago,
participants in a common practice often have quite different views
about the rules of their practice. Disagreements can arise among
participants regarding these rules, and on matters in dispute, the rules
“in the minds” of the participants diverge. But, then, on the
convergent-attitudes view under consideration, we must conclude
28
from this that where there is disagreement, there is no rule. And this
is surely an unfortunate consequence of the additive conception. We
are committed by the additive conception to regard disputes over
customary rules as impossible, but customary rules, especially
customary legal rules, are not like that; indeed, if we are to believe
Dio Chrysostom, customs typically invite critical scrutiny and, as one
might expect, dispute over that criticism.
III. INTEGRATION, NOT ADDITION: A NORMATIVE PRACTICE
ANALYSIS OF CUSTOM
The defects of the additive conception lead us to think of
Professor Hart’s “internal point of view” not as something interior to
29
an agent, but rather as the point of view from inside a practice. We
should focus on the activity, not the attitude; we should not seek to
identify some “extra ingredient,” which, when added to behavior,
30
yields customary legal norms, as Professor Bederman urged, but
rather to articulate the distinctive activity of those who participate in
the practice and to account for its legal-normative character. We
should ask not what we must add to usus, but rather what usus,

28. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 46–80 (1977).
29. This point may have been what Professor Hart had in mind. GERALD J. POSTEMA,
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A COMMON LAW WORLD 294–97 (2011)
(stating that some “understand[] Hart’s ‘distinctive normative attitude’ as internal to the social
practice, rather than to any person”). The phrase “distinctive normative attitude” is Hart’s own.
HART, supra note 22, at 255.
30. BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at ix, 4.
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understood as deed rather than bare behavior, comes to, how it is
taken up, how it informs the thinking and choices of participants. In
particular, we must consider the role it plays in their ordinary
practical reasoning. The relevant, analysis-shaping metaphor is
integration rather than addition.
The inquiry into the legal status of a candidate custom is not a
strictly empirical matter; rather, it is in an important respect
normative. As observers, we must look not simply at what
participants do, but at what they do competently. This observation
requires that we grasp the standards of competent performance
implicit in their practice, which in turn involves some degree of
competency in the practice. Moreover, because custom that is likely
to be eligible for legal status is a public rule, the deliberation in which
it is embedded is never a private matter, but rather involves
deliberation as a common, public practice. As a result, the
relationship between an individual member’s participation and the
practice of the group will be complex. As participants would put it,
our customs are a matter of what we do, not what I might do for my
own part only; but, of course, what we do comprises and is composed
of what each does when doing it as part of the group practicing the
custom. Thus, custom is never reducible to what each participant does
or to what each says, or thinks, or believes about what each does.
My proposal, then, is to begin our inquiry into custom and its
potential significance as law by looking at the role of a candidate
practiced rule—a rule that accords to a deed some social significance
in the practical deliberation of parties who competently use it, where
that deliberation is itself part of a common activity of competent use.
I begin this inquiry some distance from customary law with a
characterization of customs in general, or at least of a large and
important domain of phenomena that we typically call “customs,” and
then I consider how further to refine and specify this characterization
to fit and account for legally relevant custom. But, before we proceed,
a word about method is needed.
A. Custom’s Complexity
The phenomena evoked since ancient times by the word
“custom” and its analogues in other languages (ethos, usus,
consuetudo, coutume, coustume, and the like) are very diverse. They
range from mere habit (of thought or action) to conventions explicitly
adopted for specific purposes; from narrow, single-purpose personal
policies to broad culture-constituting traditions; from those whose
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origins are lost in the mists of the past to those newly emerging or
newly minted. We might imagine these spectra arranged as
intersecting axes in multidimensional space.
We could add other axes. For example, we could imagine a depth
axis running from customs that are in the foreground of our attention,
visible, immediately accessible, and relatively easy to make explicit, to
those that lie deep in the background of our experience, implicit,
largely transparent to our consciousness, bred in the bone, and
defining horizons of thought or opportunities for action rather than
31
directing them. We might add a life-cycle axis that runs from customs
in gestation, emerging but not yet fully formed, through mature and
stable customs, to those that have died, some of which remain in
routines of thought or conduct, although they have lost their original
point or meaning and have acquired no other revitalizing meaning.
This axis would record the fact that customs often undergo career
changes in midlife—having been born for one sort of purpose or
problem, customs can take on new and different tasks over their life
spans. We could also add an engagement axis that displays the nature
and depth of engagement of participants ranging from full-fledged,
committed engagement of self-identified participants to those at
different points on the periphery: conformists, who are intensely
interested but still on the outside; the alienated, who while on the
outside nevertheless track the conduct of engaged participants and
modify their own conduct accordingly; and the indifferent, who can
afford to ignore the common rules of others. Customs can also vary
along a discursivity axis from the entirely nondiscursive to the fully
discursive (reason giving and logic governed) and explicitly discursive
(that is, publicly argumentative). On the nondiscursive end we find
familiar technical arts—plumbing, for example or, better maybe, jazz
32
improvisation in a small ensemble —whereas forensic practices might
sit on the other end. I may have overlooked yet other dimensions, but
we can conclude this unsystematic survey with a moral-value axis
ranging from the trivial to the morally compelling.

31. Some of these examples may also be embedded in the material world, available to us
only through the objects and tools we use, consume, or display. The importance and richness of
custom and culture embedded in material objects is wonderfully manifested in NEIL
MACGREGOR, THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN 100 OBJECTS (2011).
32. See Gerald J. Postema, Salience Reasoning, 27 TOPOI 41, 47–49 (2008) (“Jazz ensemble
playing relies essentially upon—and so, in its unique way, illustrates—common practical
thinking.”).
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In view of the complexity of this multidimensional space it is not
surprising that analyses of custom differ in fundamental ways,
because it is likely that they take root at different points in this space.
It would be inadvisable to attempt to offer an analysis of custom that
is safe from counterexamples and that purports to capture all these
phenomena —or all instances of what a theorist might claim is custom
“properly so-called.” A more promising strategy might mimic the one
that Professor David Lewis seems to have adopted for his influential
33
analysis of conventions.
Rather than offering a definition of conventions, a Lewisinspired approach would identify a plausible core set of social-rule
phenomena and offer a philosophical explanation of how such rules
function. It would then locate them in their natural habitat, for
example, the practical reasoning of individual, rational agents
engaged in social interactions characterized by the need for
cooperation. With an account constructed for this group of
phenomena in hand, we could explain other convention-like
phenomena, which may not share all the features salient in the core
cases, by seeing them as moving out along one or more of the axes
mentioned above. Thus, for example, customs that do not seem to be
immediately concerned with social coordination or cooperation may
nevertheless have an important cooperative dimension that could
explain why the concerns at the heart of the convention took the
shape of social rules. Likewise, some conventions that seem entirely
indifferent to social cooperation might be explained as, in one respect
or another, “downstream” from the core cases, perhaps as vestigial
conventions. Of course, such explanations are not guaranteed to
satisfy, but one useful measure of success of a general philosophical
account of custom is how well it can illuminate both the core cases it
selects for analysis and at least some (perhaps especially puzzling)
cases that, on its principle of selection, stand somewhere on the
periphery.
The success of this model of explanation depends in part on the
choice of core instances. This choice of instances is rarely
uncontroversial, of course. But for some purposes we might agree on
33. DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969). For an extended
discussion of the role Professor Lewis’s analysis of conventions has played in legal philosophy in
the last several decades, see POSTEMA, supra note 29, at 488–95. But cf. ANDREI MARMOR,
SOCIAL CONVENTIONS (2009) (taking a definitional approach to conventions). For a discussion
of Professor Andrei Marmor’s definition of conventions, see POSTEMA, supra note 29, at 519–
33.
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the main constituents of the core, especially if we can agree on the
purpose of the inquiry and on the kind of questions or puzzles the
philosophical account is meant to address. I propose to follow this
Lewis-inspired approach (although not his analysis of conventions).
The core for our purposes is roughly selected by the ultimate
objective of our inquiry: explanation of law-determining custom. For
this purpose, it is useful to start with phenomena having the following
properties. I expect wide agreement on this list. The customs in view
are: practical—pertaining to action rather than thought (for example,
rules of the road rather than rules for our judgments of causation as
David Hume understood them); normative—purporting to direct
action (for example, modes of promise making and promise keeping
rather than the predictable donning of a jacket when entering a cold
meat locker); social—not only acting as rules for members of some
community and evident in their conduct, but also acting recognizably
as rules of the community, and not merely accidentally overlapping
rules that individuals adopt just for their own part; implicit (or
perhaps I should say relatively inexplicit)—not the product of explicit
design but rather emerging from and finding expression in conduct.
Although customs may be made explicit—that is, articulated—they
do not come into existence and retain their normative status through
such articulation. Finally, they are participant engaged—practiced by
individual, rational agents who regard themselves as self-identified,
fully engaged participants amongst other members of a practiceengaged community—and embedded in a normative practice—that is,
the content of the rules is determined in the characteristic, competent
performance of a normative practice. With this rough selection in
hand, we can explore other features of customs so selected.
Building on earlier work, I propose to understand law-relevant
34
custom as a certain kind of discursive normative practice. I will
introduce and elaborate two key concepts—the concept of a
normative practice and the concept of a discursive practice—and
situate them in what I shall argue is the natural habitat of custom:
thickly interdependent social interaction. I begin with the concepts of
normative practice and social interaction, drawing out salient features
of customs so characterized. I will then identify a subclass of such

34. See Postema, supra note 21, at 279–306. My notion of a normative practice is based on
the notion introduced and elaborated in detail in Professor Robert Brandom’s discussion in
ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT (1994), and ROBERT B. BRANDOM,
ARTICULATING REASONS (2000).
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customs, those that are distinctively discursive and some salient
features of them, which I will argue make them law-relevant, by
which I mean that these features make it appropriate for us to regard
them as customary law.
B. Custom as a Normative Practice
Customs are a kind of normative practice. I explain in this
Section what it is for a practice to be a normative practice, or what the
characteristic mode of activity of participants in such a practice is.
The explanation offered is formal rather than substantive. Practices,
just insofar as they are normative, are in the business, inter alia, of
offering participants normative guidance, providing them standards
for their performances and reasons for their actions. But this formal
account is not meant to demonstrate what gives any particular
normative practice, let alone all such practices, the normative force
they claim. It invites such an account as an important and expected
supplement. It may also fix some of the parameters of such an
account, making certain accounts and the principles or values around
which they are constructed more attractive than others, but it does
not offer any specific account or provide resources to adjudicate
among eligible rivals. A substantive account of the normative force of
a normative practice must take into account the background aims of
the practice (and other moral values or principles implicated or
compromised by the practice), or of those who participate in it, and
35
the social and material context in which the practice is located. The
task here is only to provide a formal account of a practice’s
36
normativity.
Customs are norms that are embedded in and emerge from
conduct constituting normative practices. They are regularities of
conduct that differ from other observable regularities not in the
beliefs or attitudes of those who engage in it, as the additive

35. In “Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account,” Postema, supra
note 21, at 295–300, I utilize this scheme to argue for the normative force of customary
international law.
36. This distinction of tasks is rarely respected in theoretical discussions of custom. The
brief sketch of custom offered by Dio Chrysostom ignores it. As part of a formal account, he
quite reasonably identifies a voluntary element in custom and suggests that customs involve
consensus, or agreement in some practice. But there is a shift of theoretical task to say in the
same breath that the normative force of custom rests on consent. This claim is surely not
guaranteed by the claims about the voluntariness of customary practice nor its manifest
consensus. We do not get an argument for the normative force of custom for free.
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conception suggests, but rather in the mode of their participation in
the activities. Following custom involves competent performances
and judgments. Those who participate in a custom’s practice
undertake commitments (a) to judge certain performances as
appropriate or correct and others as mistaken; (b) to act when the
occasion arises in accord with these judgments; (c) to challenge
conduct that falls short of these judgments; and (d) to recognize
appeals to the judgments as vindications of their actions or valid
criticisms of them. Such commitments are not reducible to the
subjective states—beliefs, attitudes, or desires—of participants,
because they are essentially normative and intersubjective. They are
normative because to make a commitment of this sort is to take
responsibility for one’s actions and judgments and to recognize the
authority of others to hold one to this responsibility, to assess one’s
actions and judgments in light of this assumption of responsibility.
The language of commitment is the language of entitlements and
responsibilities, rather than of attitudes; it is the language of what one
may properly be held to, rather than language of what one holds or
believes. Moreover, commitments are intersubjective: they establish
or presuppose a normative relation among participants in the
practice, a kind of reciprocally recognized standing or status.
Customs of the sort we have in view are normative practices
planted in the soil of human social interaction (as Professor
Mendelson recognized). Among the first to appreciate the
37
importance of social interaction for customs was Hume, but it was
Professor Fuller who introduced the idea to American
38
jurisprudence. Since the 1970s, game-theoretic accounts of social
rules and conventions, that of Professor Lewis most prominently,
have developed increasingly sophisticated models for Professor
Fuller’s suggestive ideas, but the precision and sophistication of these
models come at a price. Because of their initial assumptions about the
private nature of rationality, it is difficult to account for the social—
that is, intersubjective or public—and the normative character of
39
customs. Moreover, because social rules on these accounts are said
37. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 311–30 (David Fate Norton &
Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) (1739–1740).
38. See Fuller, supra note 25, at 1 (“Customary law . . . has found direct expression in the
conduct of men toward one another.”).
39. At best, they explain how stable, convergent personal strategies might arise, but these
strategies fall short of public norms. For similar problems facing Professor Hayek’s otherwise
fascinating account of social rules, see Gerald J. Postema, Nature as First Custom: Hayek on the
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to emerge as solutions to cooperation problems, the accounts seem to
be limited to contexts of social interaction that pose cooperation
problems. Yet, it would be a mistake to abandon the Hume-Fuller
insight that customs presuppose and address human beings engaged
in thickly interdependent social interaction. For it provides us with a
ready and illuminating explanation of the necessary intersubjectivity
of these rules and it leaves open the possibility of integrating the
essentially discursive character of law-relevant customs into this more
general account of custom.
Customs, Professor Fuller announces at the opening of his essay,
find their “direct expression in the conduct of men toward one
40
another.” That is, customs are reciprocally oriented conduct.
Customs are expressed in socially meaningful conduct and they
acquire their meaning in the context of interaction. Customary
conduct in its mature manifestations is decidedly not habitual
behavior, unmindful of the social environment into which it is
projected, but rather it is the conduct of agents aware of their
environment. Like a move in a game or a dance step, it is an
41
appropriate response to or anticipation of the conduct of others.
Interaction of the kind that Fuller had in mind is interdependent
action, and for that reason, agents engaged in social interaction are
also deliberatively interdependent. The interactive environment to
which parties respond consists of other parties responding to their
environment, which in turn involves the responses (actual or
anticipated) of the first. Caught in the net of interactions, one must
know not only what others have done, but also how they understand
what they have done, what they expect one to do, and so how they
expect one to understand what one has done and what they have
done. Social interaction is characterized by interconnected conduct
and interlocked expectations. An agent acquires a grasp of what her
own action might mean and what its practical upshot might be by
understanding it in the context of this network of “intermeshing
anticipations,” from which the agents can “gauge the general scope of
42
the repertory from which responses to their actions will be drawn.”

Evolution of Social Rules, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Peter J. Boettke & Todd J. Zywicki eds., forthcoming 2012).
40. Fuller, supra note 25, at 1 (emphasis added).
41. Mendelson recognizes this interactive element in his account of custom in international
law. Mendelson, supra note 14, at 189–91.
42. Fuller, supra note 25, at 2.
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Customs are relatively stable points or nodes in the network of
expectations. The meaning or content of customs typically arises from
salient patterns of past actions in the group, but these patterns are not
accessible apart from the network of anticipations or of the choices
43
and deliberations of others in which each shares. Thus, custom
following is never a matter of rote repetition of one’s past behavior,
disengaged imitation of observed behavior of others, or simple
application of a preconceived representation or rule. Rather, it
involves the agent grasping the significance of some pattern and
recognizing its application in the given circumstances of the conduct,
against the background of intermeshing anticipations and
understandings of others. The fact that we learn to grasp patterns and
recognize how to follow them quickly and effortlessly in much of our
social interaction should not blind us to the complex dimensions of
44
custom-following activity.
Customs understood as normative practices emerging from the
soil of social interaction have four important properties we can
isolate: they are public, temporal, concrete, and internally
interconnected. First, customs are public and the deeds that purport to
follow them are uttered conduct. Not only are individual actions
offered in public space, but also the significance and standing, the
point of engaging in them, depends in part at least on their public
recognition or anticipation. Customs lend public significance to
actions undertaken in contexts of social interaction and thereby
enable them to achieve individually and collectively sought outcomes.
Second, customs are temporal. They are mortal; they come into
existence at or over some discrete period of time and die or petrify at
some later time. Their vitality is a function of the ability of agents

43. In “Salience Reasoning,” Postema, supra note 32, at 36, I argue that deliberative
reasoning in this context is a form of common reasoning.
44. Of course, it is possible that some behavior we are inclined to treat as custom following
does not have this character at all, at least to the agents involved. For example, the complex
interactive dimension of the conduct may be entirely invisible to the agent involved because the
nodes in the network are very stable and the practice of them is deep set in an agent’s
behavioral routine. In this case, the custom itself may rise to visibility only when something goes
wrong, and even then it may be difficult for the agent to articulate what went wrong. But also it
is possible that the behavioral routine has been so deeply bred in the bone that it persists even
after all calls for it to help navigate social interactions are silenced. Some customs, as noted
above, die and dissolve, but others petrify, remaining in an agent’s behavioral repertory long
after they have any point. The facts surveyed in this footnote do not challenge my main thesis
that mature and vital customs take their life in and from a network of thickly interdependent
social interaction.
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caught in webs of social interaction to use them to navigate
successfully their common world. But there is more to the temporal
dimension of customs than their life spans. Customs are often thought
to be necessarily ancient, immemorial, or at least of some significantly
long duration. Dio Chrysostom maintained that customs are invented
45
“by life and time.” Thus, the talk of instant custom strikes some as
paradoxical or even nonsensical. In many legal contexts, however, the
requirement of duration seems motivated largely by evidentiary
concerns. It is thought necessary to require proof that a custom has
been in effect in a community for some years—for Blackstone’s
English common law, from “immemorial usage,” that is, since the
46
beginning of Richard I’s reign in 1189 —in order to avoid formally
acknowledging and enforcing practices that are ephemeral or the
product of narrow interests or to avoid confusing custom with wishful
thinking or cheap talk. But these concerns treat the temporal
dimension of custom as a useful proxy for other qualities deemed
important. There is nothing fundamentally paradoxical about “instant
custom.” Stable points in a network of expectations often form over
time, but this is not essential to their nature. What is essential is their
place in the network, however it is acquired.
Yet, custom typically does have a deeper temporal significance,
not because venerable custom is reliably wise or good, but rather
because custom works by structuring time in some domain of social
life. Customs structure or anchor time in the way meter anchors time
in music. Professor Jeremy Begbie writes, “Temporality in music is
principally manifest through rhythm, more precisely, through rhythm
interacting with metre. Metre is a configuration of beats permeating a
47
piece of music.” The wave-like ebb and flow of meter makes
possible the vastly varying and engaging patterns of rhythm. The
meter that we feel anchors, and in that way makes possible, the
rhythm we hear; the significance of that rhythm is necessarily
48
extended over time and is inconceivable otherwise. Likewise, custom
enables meaningful regularities and variations in social interaction
and this meaningfulness could not be achieved except over time. To
be mindful of custom in a domain of social life is to be mindful of
45. CHRYSOSTOM, supra note 2, at 253.
46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78. For a discussion of the duration
needed to establish a practice as a matter of customary international law, see LEPARD, supra
note 12, at 35–36, 224–28.
47. JEREMY S. BEGBIE, THEOLOGY, MUSIC AND TIME 39 (2000) (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 39–44.
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time in that domain, mindful of the public significance of conduct
over time for members of the custom community.
Third, customs are concretely practical. By this, I have in mind
the fact that customs are not merely prescriptions for action, but are
modes of conduct that arise from and are embedded in deeds in a
complex way. Learning to make one’s way within a normative
practice involves mastering a discipline—a discipline of grasping the
custom-relevant significance of actions in their concrete
circumstances (Professor Llewellyn called this “situation sense”) and
of judging how to apply rules to those circumstances (Kant called this
“Mutterwitz”). Moreover, because customary rules arise from
practice, they are answerable to the deeds that make up the practice.
The activity of the practice, not any articulated account of it, nor
theoretical reconstruction of it, is on its own authoritative. The
practice is the commons from which all participants draw and to
which they all contribute. What is decisive for parties is not what any
participant thinks, or a majority or even all participants at a time
think, about what is or ought to be done, but what the participants are
actually doing. That is a matter to be construed by any and all. What
anchors participants’ disputes about the nature and force of what they
are doing is the doing and not their beliefs about it. This anchoring is
a direct implication of the crucial fact that what any of them say or
think is subject to standards of correctness implicit in the practice,
standards anyone familiar with the practice can deploy to assess what
is said or thought. It is entailed by the fact that the recognition of
standing to hold participants to their commitments is mutual and
reciprocal. No one, not even the entire community, has
unchallengeable, final say on what the norms of the practice are.
Thus, disputes about what we are doing (as participants put it) are not
in themselves threats to the practice, neither are they evidence that
the practice is unraveling, but rather they can be expected, especially
when what we are doing is important and the stakes are high. It
follows that no proposal for an understanding of what we are doing or
required to do in some range of instances of the practice is ruled out
on the ground that it is novel or not widely accepted. The credibility
of the proposed understanding will depend on the strength of the case
49
that can be made for its being integral to the practice as a whole.

49. The points of this paragraph are, of course, familiar to readers of RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986), although the dynamics of custom were far from his mind. Professor
Dworkin tended to dismiss custom as “runic traditionalism.” Id. at 89.
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Finally, customs are typically internally interconnected; they tend
to hunt in packs. Professor Ekkehart Schlicht gives a simple, homely
example. The old-fashioned polite greeting of tipping one’s hat
50
depends on the custom of wearing of hats. More complexly
interwoven customs structure the high-stakes interactions among
drivers on the highways and between drivers and pedestrians on
urban streets. An explanation of this interconnectedness is ready to
hand. Customs, on the useful Fullerian picture we considered earlier,
are stable nodes in a network of “intermeshing anticipations,” in a
51
repertoire of actions, responses, countermoves, and corrections. The
code shaping this scheme could not merely be an aggregate of
discrete and unrelated rules. The various component rules or nodes
would surely be sensitive to the weight and pull of other nodes when
one of them seems implicated in some given circumstances. Discrete
and isolated customs are not inconceivable, but they are likely to be
rare largely because our occasions for social interaction from which
customs arise and to which they are addressed are rarely discrete and
isolated.
C. Discursive Normative Practices
This account of custom as interaction-embedded normative
practices could apply equally to commercial practices, to rules of
international diplomacy, and to jazz improvisation in a small
ensemble. Not only is there nothing necessarily linguistic about these
practices—that is, nothing requiring articulation in language—but
also this account does not recognize that some interaction-embedded
normative practices are discursive, not just accidentally or in part, but
essentially. Parties who engage in discursive normative practices are
not only in the business of using and articulating concepts, but also
they offer, explore, and assess reasons and arguments. The moves and
countermoves they make are moves in argument—offering claims,
counterclaims, challenges, and responses, offers of warrants for action
and rejections of them. The norms of a discursive normative practice
get their content from the roles they play in networks of reasons and
argument. Identifying and fixing the requirements of norms of a
discursive practice involves exploring the reasons and arguments for
and against them and the conclusions that they support and those
they do not support. Thus, the discipline mastery of which is required
50. EKKEHART SCHLICHT, ON CUSTOM IN THE ECONOMY 144–45 (1998).
51. Fuller, supra note 25, at 2.
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for full participation in these custom-forming normative practices is a
discipline of deliberative reasoning. Discursive practices make
possible thoughtful, public adjusting of norms to changing
circumstances, renegotiating on the ground, as it were, the terms of
commitments within the practice. Dio Chrysostom thought critical
scrutiny was typical of all custom; even if he overstated the case, he
was surely correct about customs that take shape in discursive
normative practices.
Discursive normative practices are thickly systematic. Customs
take their content and practical force from two systems into which
they are integrated: the system of intermeshing anticipations of the
social interaction network and the discursive system of reasons and
arguments, which we might call the “discursive network.” The
existence, content, proper scope, and normative force of customary
norms are all functions of the place they hold in the discursive
network, and their ability to guide and shape the deliberations and
actions of members of the custom community depends on the
members’ mastery of the discipline of argument that is characteristic
of the practice. Customary norms are established, and they mature,
not by virtue of repetition or imitation, and not by virtue of the fact,
or parties’ beliefs, that they ought to be established, but rather by
virtue of their integration into the discursive network. And whether or
not a candidate customary norm has such a place, whether it is indeed
integrated into the system, is settled neither by empirical observation
of parties’ behavior, nor by interrogating them to determine what
they believe or even what they accept, but rather by demonstrating by
argument internal to the system of that normative practice that they
have such a place in it. This is an essentially normative and discursive,
rather than evidential, mode of demonstration. Integration is the
fundamental test; any other is parasitic on it. And, because of the
intensely practical orientation of custom’s normative practice, this
integration is not an abstract, theoretical matter, but rather a matter
of adjustment and accommodation of action and mutual expectations.
Integration is an essential part of the process of custom formation, a
process that is discursive, but always also public and intensely
pragmatic.
It follows, then, that in discursive normative practices the
distinction between deeds and words breaks down. It would be a
mistake to say that conduct is unnecessary and all that is needed for
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the formation of a custom are arguments (evidence of opinio juris).
For arguments in discursive normative practices are arguments about
and drawn from deeds. And in view of the essential concreteness of
customs, such arguments, which involve articulations of deeds and the
rules implicit in them, are answerable to deeds. But it also is true that
in discursive normative practices, words—that is, publicly articulated
claims, counterclaims, and arguments about both—are among the
custom-relevant deeds. Words and deeds are equally important
aspects of the practice. Participants’ deeds and words are constituent
elements of the deliberative practice, not merely evidence of
something else (for example, the mental states of participants) that
constitutes the practice as the additive conception would have us
believe. Through deed and word, custom-forming commitments are
undertaken, recognized, affirmed, challenged, revised, and extended.
In the formation of custom, deed and word work together. Through
articulating claims and responses, the deed takes on custom-relevant
significance. Thus, for example, in international law whether the
action of a state counts as a juridical claim or an act of comity, or
whether silence on the part of other potentially interested parties
counts as a response to the claim, let alone as acquiescence to or
protest against it, is never a function of the mental state of the agents
or observers (their opinio juris or otherwise), but of their proper
articulation and defense, as dictated by proprieties of the background
normative practice.
IV. CUSTOMARY LAW
At this point, one might reasonably ask what this account of
custom has to do with legally significant custom or customary law.
Can customs embedded in normative practices count as law? We can
begin to answer this question by distinguishing two versions of the
question. One version asks a generic question about the legal status of
custom regimes or systems understood as large-scale discursive

52. For recent discussions by theorists who hold this view, see, for example, LEPARD, supra
note 12, at 6; and Tasioulas, supra note 10, at 30; see also Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source
of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1974–1975), which argues that it is possible for
states to change undesirable customs “by repeatedly declaring that the old rule no longer
exists.” Critics of so-called “new” or “declaratory” international law sometimes see the decision
of the International Court of Justice in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101–02 (June 27), as accepting this view, see
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81
AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 147 (1987).
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normative practices; a second version asks a more specific question
about the legal status of some candidate customary norm. The first
asks, generically, what makes custom regimes so described law, while
the latter asks what makes this or that custom a law. I consider the
generic version first.
A. What Makes Custom Law? The Generic Question
We can take the generic question in two ways: we can ask what
makes custom regimes described in this way law (“law properly socalled,” some might say) or we can ask of some customary legal
regime whether it is or approximates a large-scale discursive
normative practice. Taken the first way, we might ask whether, for
example, the medieval transnational commercial system (the so-called
lex mercatoria), assuming it is adequately described by the normative
53
practice account, was a system of customary law. To make this claim
raises large questions of general jurisprudence, which I will not
address here. But a more limited response is possible. We can point
out, for example, that custom regimes characterized by the normative
practice account are remarkably law-like; that there are strong
similarities between them and municipal legal systems, despite
undeniable dissimilarities. Both are public, discursive, and
argumentative. Although the formal institutional features of
municipal law may not be found to the same degree in customary
regimes, there are still significant analogies of function and form to
warrant regarding them, for many purposes, as legal or quasi-legal
systems. Ultimately, however, this way of formulating the generic
question is not very interesting. A more interesting question is
whether the discursive normative practice account fits widely
accepted examples of customary law regimes, for example, customary
international law. The answer to this question is a clear and definite
yes.

53. A lively debate has arisen over the nature of medieval lex mercatoria. Professor Leon
E. Trakman makes a strong case for the evolved, strictly private, customary nature of lex
mercatoria. See generally LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMMERCIAL LAW (1983); Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant
Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265 (2003). Professor Emily Kadens offers a powerful challenge to
this thesis, arguing that the most important parts of medieval commercial law had their roots in
contract and legislation and that public fora were as likely to be used to solve disputes as private
ones. See Emily Kadens, Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the
Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39, 42 (2004); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the
Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2012).
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The domain of international relations is understood by some
observers to be a close approximation of a Hobbesian state of nature,
dominated by actors (states) motivated solely by rational self-interest.
Such actors are thought to have no capacity to grasp norms, (other
than norms of rational, expected-utility maximization, of course) let
alone to be motivated by them. Thus, on this view, international law
54
as a normative enterprise is a myth. The alleged myth reflects actual
phenomena—a complex interactive, discursive, and norm-governed
process—but this process is causally inefficacious and so is
explanatorily vacuous.
We need not settle here the long-running debate between the
realist, rational-actor theory and its institutional, norm-recognizing
rivals, because the issue addressed by the normative practice account
of custom is not one of causal explanation but rather of socialpractice interpretation. The question for us is whether that proposed
interpretation scheme is adequate to the phenomena of transnational
activity thought to be structured by customary international law.
Those phenomena are not in fact challenged by realist skepticism; on
the contrary, realist skepticism presupposes the phenomena and then
denies their causal efficacy. It is these phenomena we need to
examine in order to judge the relevance and usefulness of the
normative practice account of custom defended in this Section.
Students of international relations who recognize some role for
international norms, whether treaty-based or custom-based, and so
recognize international law in some form, describe the domain as one
which, at its center, is a complexly interactive, iterative, and
essentially discursive process. “[A] discursive process of explanation,
justification, and persuasion is a central attribute of international
55
affairs,” write Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes. They suggest
that, as a matter of practical necessity, caused by deep and broad
interdependence and the strong need for an effective international
system, international actors are forced to give reasons for their past or
proposed actions, to characterize their deeds, and to explain and

54. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 13 (2005).
55. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 127
(1995); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
14 (1995) (describing international law as a “process of discourse, reasoning, and negotiation”
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 477 (“[M]uch of the attempt at interaction [in the transnational
domain] is discursive: an interlocutory process of exhortation, expiation, explanation, and
exposition.”).
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justify them to the relevant transnational publics. These proffered
interpretations and justifications, in turn, are reviewed, evaluated,
reinterpreted, accepted, or challenged by other parties, which invites
56
further argumentative response from the original actor and others.
This process involves many transnational actors, including heads of
state, diplomats, legislators, and other state officials; international,
regional, and domestic courts; ad hoc tribunals; transnational
institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council;
nongovernmental organizations and a host of other less formal or
57
institutionalized discourse participants. This context of discourse is
more diffuse and decentralized than that of municipal legal systems,
but it has a broadly similar discursive structure. “[I]n international
relations, where authoritative determinations analogous to umpires’
rulings are the exception, the parties themselves must interpret each
others’ moves and constantly renegotiate the reality in which they
58
operate,” Professor Friedrich Kratochwil observes. Claims are
advanced and interpretations and defenses of actions are offered;
exchanges of interpretations are made with other parties;
counterclaims or challenges are advanced; arguments are offered,
59
reviewed, assessed, and answered. “In the international system,
which does not have the benefit of much judicial assistance, the norms
are interpreted, elaborated, shaped, reformulated, and applied” by a
variety of parties in “the course of debate about the justification for
contested action. The discourse is not confined to the meaning of the
norm, but extends to the acceptable grounds or excuse for
60
nonperformance.”
The customary law process in particular, Professor Mendelson
61
observed, “is one of continuous claim and response,” in which the
claiming and responding (and responding to the response, etc.) are
carried on in an articulated, discursive mode, through offering
interpretations, reasons, and arguments drawing on the regime of
customary law. It is “[o]ut of this constant process of claim and
62
response [that] rules emerge, are strengthened, or are superseded.”
56. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 55, at 25–26, 28, 118–23.
57. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2640 (1996).
58. FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 102 (1989).
59. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 55, at 122.
60. Id.
61. Mendelson, supra note 14, at 189–91.
62. Id. at 190.
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The normative practice account of custom fits comfortably the
phenomena of international customary law described by these
observers.
B. What Makes a Custom a Law? The Specific Question
We distinguished a second question about the legal status of
custom as characterized in this Essay. We can ask what makes this or
that alleged customary rule a law, that is, what makes it legally
significant or binding. This is the form of the question in which
theorists of municipal and international law are typically more
interested. The account of customary norms articulated above
provides a sophisticated answer to this question. Note, first, that on
this account, whether any alleged rule is binding or practically
significant as a custom is settled by determining whether it has a place
or role in some ongoing, practically oriented, discursive normative
practice. What qualifies a norm as a normatively significant custom,
we saw earlier, is its integration into a discursive, deed-based system
63
of norms. We also saw that whether a given norm is so integrated is
a matter determined not by observation or interrogation of
64
participants’ beliefs or attitudes, but discursively, by argument. So,
the question of whether some alleged custom is binding is always
answered relative to some practice, arguing that it has a proper place
in its system of norms. A fortiori, the question whether a custom is
legally binding is answered not in general but relative to some
particular legal system or other.
Thus, on the normative practice account, what qualifies a given
custom as legally significant or binding in some legal system is
whether that custom is incorporated into the larger set of norms of
that legal system, or, more likely, whether it is integrated into a
custom regime which in turn is incorporated into the legal system.
How, then, does one know whether some activity in which states
seem to engage with some regularity is governed by a binding norm of
customary international law, as opposed to being a matter of comity,
mere politeness, mere convergence of behavior-serving self-interest,
or sheer habit? The answer is that this fact is not to be determined by
exploring the beliefs or attitudes of states or their officials, but rather
to look at the way the conduct is “read” in the transnational public
domain. In particular, it is determined by how the agents tend to
63. See supra Part III.C.
64. See supra Part III.C.
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characterize their actions, the terms in which they seek to vindicate
them, how these attempts are taken up by other participants in the
practice, how the actions are affirmed, resisted, criticized, and the
like. We can determine this fact, to some degree, “from the outside”
by looking at the kinds of interpretations and arguments that are
given for and against the act, how those arguments are related to
other descriptions and arguments, and the like. The normative
practice account insists, however, that ultimately the legal status of
any alleged norm is determined by the place it actually has in the
practice system, and that is a matter for discursive argument, not
external observation (even if it is observation of the arguments of
others). Claims about the legally binding status of some alleged
custom are only discharged discursively, that is, by substantive
argument.
This discursive account represents a fundamental challenge to
the additive conception of custom’s answer to the question of what
makes an alleged custom legally binding because substantive reasons,
not evidence from external observations (and inferences to claims
about internal states), are the only currency recognized by the
normative practice account. We, however, must introduce one
qualification of this account of what qualifies a custom as legally
binding. The qualification stems from the observation that it is a
contingent matter whether custom plays any role in a given legal
system and, if it does play a role, what role that is. These
determinations can vary across legal systems. A legal system may give
no role to custom or it may give it a role under certain more-or-less
limited conditions. Thus, a legal system may impose pedigree-like
conditions on the validity of customs in that system. Among such
conditions might be, for example, that customs must be approved by
the sovereign or recognized by the courts, or, like English common
law did, according to Blackstone, it might require that customs be
ancient, continued, peaceable, certain, compulsory, consistent, and
65
reasonable. A legal system might even insist that for a custom to
acquire legally binding status in its domain there must be proof of
long consistent usus and demonstrable opinio juris on the part of
those participating in the practice. Legal systems might impose such
conditions in various ways—in constitutional instruments, by explicit
legislation, through the development of judicial doctrine, or even
through being rooted in a principle never explicitly enacted. They
65. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *76–79.
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may do so for a variety of reasons of policy, principle, evidentiary
reliability, or the like. But the conditions would be specific to the
legal system in view, not general conditions on what qualifies custom
for legal significance. And the content and force of such customlimiting conditions is, of course, determined by the best general
theory of that system as a whole, taking all its elements into account.
These considerations make the normative practice account more
complex, but they are not inconsistent with it. Indeed, they are
actually required by it. For on this account whether a custom has legal
significance in a given legal system is strictly a matter of its
integration into the custom regime that is an integral part of that
system. The arguments for such integration must take into account all
relevant components of the system. Principles laying out criteria for
the legal status of customs in the system may be among those
components. So, to determine whether a custom has legal significance
in that system one must take into account those criteria-defining
principles.
The lesson to be learned from this qualification is twofold. First,
perhaps we should not entirely consign the additive framework to the
jurisprudential scrap heap, because it may play a role in some legal
systems as a more or less convenient proxy for a more nuanced
explanation of the legal status of custom in those systems. The
additive conception may be among those legal doctrines and
conceptions, which, although unfortunate and perhaps not entirely
coherent, nevertheless do some work (and perhaps do damage) in
actual legal systems. But, second, we should also recognize that the
additive conception is not forced on any existing legal system. There
is an alternative understanding that is one far more plausible and
workable. If a legal system chooses to utilize the additive conception,
it should do so aware that it is creating unnecessary trouble.
CONCLUSION
International law gives normative shape to conduct through a
complex, interactive, essentially discursive process. Custom plays an
essential role in this process. Custom is pervasive in social life and in
law and, arguably, custom is foundational in international law.
Custom takes many widely varying forms in social life. I have argued
that legally relevant custom—custom that can play a significant role
in law—is best understood as embedded in discursive normative
practices among parties who are engaged in networks of
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deliberatively interdependent interaction. Legally relevant customs
are forms of reciprocally oriented conduct that takes its meaning from
a practice of offering claims and counterclaims, challenges and
responses. The hallmark of such customs is not the addition of belief
(opinio juris) to behavior (usus), but rather the integration of
meaningful conduct into a web of reasons and arguments. A norm
rooted in conduct is a norm of customary international law in virtue
of its integration into the system of norms (the corpus juris) of
international law, not in virtue of beliefs of actors or judges about the
legal status or bindingness of the norm. The place that a norm holds
in the system is established by normative argument, tracing its
internal connections to other norms of the system and to conduct that
complies with them. Argument, not attitude, determines legal status
of a customary norm. Integration is not an ingredient added to
conduct; rather, it supplies the context in which the conduct acquires
its normative significance. Outside of that context it is a “deed
66
without a name.”

66. This echoes the witches’ characterization of their inscrutable behavior in WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 4, sc. 1, line 48 (A.R. Braunmuller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2008).

